Indiana Journal of Law and Social
Equality
Volume 10

Issue 2

Article 7

Summer 6-30-2022

Implicating Implicit Bias in the Judiciary: Using Contextual
Analyses to Bring About Meaningful Systemic Reform
Stephen Morris
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, sttmorri@iu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ijlse
Part of the Law Commons

Publication Citation
Stephen Morris, Implicating Implicit Bias in the Judiciary: Using Contextual Analyses to Bring About
Meaningful Systemic Reform, 10 Ind. J.L. & Soc. Equal. 475 (2022).

This Student Note is brought to you for free and open
access by the Maurer Law Journals at Digital Repository
@ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality by an
authorized editor of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For
more information, please contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

2022]

Implicating Implicit Bias in the Judiciary

475

Implicating Implicit Bias in the Judiciary: Using Contextual Analyses to
Bring About Meaningful Systemic Reform
INTRODUCTION

Stephen Morris*

The prevailing paradigm in cognitive psychology is that humans think in two
distinct ways: fast and slow.1 The fast process is often characterized as animalistic,
intuitive, and reflexive, in order to make decisions in a split second.2 The slow
process, on the other hand, is based on reason and deliberative thought.3 When it
comes to addressing the problem of racial bias, this model has provided an
exceedingly helpful tool kit given the relative subsidence of overt or intentionally
discriminatory behavior in the early twenty-first century.4 Research has shown that
people who do not self-report any racial animus and may even consider themselves
anti-racist, nevertheless behave in racist ways when they are either fatigued or
forced to make quick-fire decisions.5
However, this paradigm has had a major shortcoming: implicit biases are
often treated as so automatic that they are primal and instinctual.6 Conversely, a
behaviorist-based analysis would likely show that these fast processes are just as
much a product of learning as the more deliberative processes.7 Because these
implicit associations are learned early in life, they can appear automatic and
intrinsic―almost natural.8 Yet they are not automatic by virtue of the animal mind
or “human nature” any more than someone who spends 10,000 hours practicing and
playing guitar can flawlessly play a solo in a way that looks almost second nature to
a casual observer.9
Fast thinking, also known as System 1 processes,10 can create problems for
human behavior that range from the mundane to the most serious problems in
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JD 2022, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. The author would like to thank Professors Victor
Quintanilla and Louise Barrett, as well as Dr. Christina Nord, for their advice and editorial assistance.
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 20–22 (1st ed. 2011).
See B. Keith Payne, Weapon Bias: Split-Second Decisions and Unintended Stereotyping, 15 CURRENT
DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI. 287, 287 (2006).
See THOMAS GILOVICH & LEE ROSS, THE WISEST ONE IN THE ROOM: HOW YOU CAN BENEFIT FROM SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY’S MOST POWERFUL INSIGHTS 135–36 (2016).
See, e.g., Christian S. Crandall & Amy Eshleman, The Justification-Suppression Model of Prejudice: An
Approach to the History of Prejudice Research, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE: HISTORICAL AND
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 240 (Christian S. Crandall & Mark Schaller eds., 2004) (noting that racist behavior
has moved from overt beliefs and actions into a less salient “aversive” racism).
Payne, supra note 2, at 287–88; see KAHNEMAN, supra note 1, at 25–26.
See GILOVICH & ROSS, supra note 3, at 135–36.
See HUGO MERCIER & DAN SPERBER, THE ENIGMA OF REASON 71 (2019).
See KAHNEMAN, supra note 1, at 90.
See Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Implicit Revolution: Reconceiving the Relation
Between Conscious and Unconscious, 72 AM. PSYCH. 861, 866–67 (2017); see also MICHAEL JACKSON, Beat It,
on THRILLER (Epic Records 1982) (featuring guest guitar solo by Eddie Van Halen).
See KAHNEMAN, supra note 1, at 20–22.
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society. We may give way to an anchoring number when buying a car11 or, in an
extreme example, decide someone is carrying a gun rather than a harmless tool.12
Even when we are able to correct for these System 1 errors,13 we face an uphill
battle with slower thinking, too. System 2 processes are characterized as more
deliberative or rational, including experiences of “agency, choice, and
concentration.”14 When in this mode, individuals still face problems such as
confirmation bias when making conscious choices.15
For example, the CEO of a large corporation may give an explanation why
they do not have many minority employees by saying there just is not enough talent
in the labor market.16 It seems perfectly reasonable and follows logically. However,
some may see this statement as a bald-faced justification for the status quo, or, at
the very least, a problematic statement given our notions of a free and equal society
where the best and brightest are thought to always rise to the top. Yet others might
see a valid reason for the employment gap, totally justifying the lack of diversity.
Giving justifications for potentially unseemly behavior demonstrates that even
when a person gives careful, deliberative thought to a question, they can err just as
much, if not more, when using quick System 1 thinking.
This Note sets out to merge System 1 and System 2 thinking back into a
single system: the actor(s) and their environment(s). Rather than adjusting
behavior individually, reformers should train their focus on the larger contingencies
that either cause or facilitate biased or discriminatory behavior. Applying this
broader, systemic analysis of judicial behavior will help identify the root issues and
provide for systemic change. This Note will use consent searches by police as
developed by the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as an
exemplar of the problems with treating Systems 1 and 2 separately, both in police
practice and upon judicial review. From that vantage point, one can see how an
individual-based approach has made some progress in tackling bias but will
ultimately fall short of its goals without a reconceptualization of cognition.
I. NAÏVE REALISM, BIASES, AND “FAST” THINKING
The dominant theory of cognition is dual-process theory, which was
popularized by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky,17 culminating in Kahneman’s
11
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See KAHNEMAN, supra note 1, at 124–25.
See Payne, supra note 2, at 287.
See MERCIER & SPERBER, supra note 7, at 47. Although not all heuristic thinking leads to negative outcomes,
this Note will discuss only the detrimental aspects as it pertains to bias and discrimination.
See KAHNEMAN, supra note 1, at 21–22.
See id. at 80–81.
In fact, the CEO of Wells Fargo recently said just that. Mark Murphy, Why Did Wells Fargo’s CEO Say
That “There Is a Very Limited Pool of Black Talent to Recruit from”?, FORBES (Sept. 23, 2020, 9:23 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/markmurphy/2020/09/23/why-did-wells-fargos-ceo-say-that-there-is-a-verylimited-pool-of-black-talent-to-recruit-from/ - 182918336474.
Lee Ross, Mark Lepper, & Andrew Ward, History of Social Psychology: Insights, Challenges, and
Contributions to Theory and Application, in HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 16 (Susan T. Fiske, Daniel
T. Gilbert, & Gardner Lindzey Eds. 2010).
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best-selling book, Thinking, Fast and Slow.18 Psychologists have demonstrated that
thinking can be either “fast,” that is impulsive, automatic, and reflexive; or “slow,”
that is deliberate, reasoned, and analytical.19 Empirical studies focusing on this
“fast” mode of thinking have taken off in the last two decades. One of the seminal
studies was Anthony Greenwald, Debbie McGhee, and Jordan Schwartz’s
development of the Implicit Association Test, which is a way to indirectly measure
bias in individuals who may not outwardly or consciously hold these biases.20
Embedded in this dualistic model of cognition is an apparent value
judgement: does anyone want to believe they can be influenced by such simplistic,
subconscious processes—that are seemingly out of their control—not least when
they involve prejudice? Of course not. In fact, a survey of judges found the vast
majority of those polled rated themselves above average on such things (a so-called
Lake Wobegon Effect).21 Additionally, viewing these effects as automatic or intrinsic
may do more harm than good,22 putting the solution out of reach by engendering a
fatalistic attitude.23
Implicit biases can and do trickle up into slow System 2 thinking when
judicial decision makers rely on their common sense to come up with lay theories of
how a person acts in a given situation, a phenomenon known as intuitive
psychology.24 After all, judges who see themselves as knowledgeable about the law
and impartial in temperament may be less likely to second guess their own decision
making.25 Yet there is often a gap between what judges believe they are considering
based on judicial doctrine and what the social sciences demonstrate they are
actually considering.26
Linda Hamilton Krieger and Susan Fiske, who have studied naïve realism in
employment law cases, offer a method called “behavioral realism” to counter the lay
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KAHNEMAN, supra note 1, at 20–21.
See SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION: FROM BRAINS TO CULTURE 33 (3d ed. 2017);
MERCIER & SPERBER, supra note 7, at 46.
See Anthony G. Greenwald, Debbie E. McGhee & Jordan L. K. Schwartz, Measuring Individual Differences
in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1464, 1464–65 (1998).
But see Ulrich Schimmack, Invalid Claims About the Validity of Implicit Association Tests by Prisoners of
the Implicit Social-Cognition Paradigm, 16 PERSPS. ON PSYCH. SCI., 435, 440 (2021) (noting the Implicit
Associate Test and the corresponding implicit social-cognition paradigm have lacked empirical validation).
Chris P. Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV.
777, 814 (2001); Jerry Kang, Mark Bennett, Devon Carbado, Pam Casey, Nilanjana Dasgupta, David
Faigman, Rachel Godsil, Anthony G. Greenwald, Justin Levinson & Jennifer Mnookin, Implicit Bias in the
Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1173 (2012) (“One is reminded of Lake Wobegon, where all of the
children are above average.”).
See Peter Van Dessel, Jamie Cummins, Sean Hughes, Sarah Kasran, Femke Cathelyn & Tal Moran,
Reflecting on 25 Years of Research Using Implicit Measures: Recommendations for Their Future Use, 38
SOC. COGNITION S229–30 (Supp. 2020).
See id. at S229.
See Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law:
Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997, 1006 (2006).
See Guthrie et al., supra note 21, at 814.
Krieger & Fiske, supra note 24, at 1000.
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theories that judges often employ.27 This is an important step to bridge the gap
between the relatively isolated environment of judicial chambers and the real world
where cases, and the human actors within them, actually take place.28 Krieger and
Fiske argue that judges should draw upon developments in the social sciences more
often in their decisions and use recent, empirically validated findings to give more
realistic meaning to empirically-testable claims.29 This could give additional,
realistic clarity to terms such as reasonable person, consent search, and
discrimination to fit the reality on the ground.
This discordance between legal doctrine and actual human behavior is
present in an exception to antidiscrimination laws known as the same-actor of
nondiscrimination inference, which holds that an employee cannot bring a claim if
the same person both hired and fired the employee.30 The logic behind this is that
the actor who hired a member of a protected class could not possibly harbor
discriminatory intent when firing that same employee within a short time period.31
This makes sense so long as we only consider the question of whether we are
dealing with a racist person rather than considering the possibility of racist
behavior that may vary between situations.32 Numerous psychological studies have
shown that biased or discriminatory behavior of a single individual can vary across
different contexts.33
Also consider the widespread and grave problem of police use of force.
Psychological studies suggest that people are subject to subconscious racial bias
when having to determine whether a picture of an object, shown after either a Black
or White face, should be categorized as a tool or a weapon.34 Despite this evidence,
legal doctrines insulate police officers from all but the most egregious forms of
discriminatory acts.35 Behavioral realism may be able to close the gap, but it faces a
major uphill battle: the legal environment and judicial culture.
Recent work has shown that individuals and culture are constantly in flux
and feeding back into each other.36 As much as culture influences individuals, one’s
“thoughts, feelings, and actions (i.e., the self) reinforce, and sometimes change, the
sociocultural forms that shape their lives.”37 The barrier between ourselves and the
27
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Id.
See id.
See id at 1002.
Victor D. Quintanilla & Cheryl R. Kaiser, The Same-Actor Inference of Nondiscrimination: Moral
Credentialing and the Psychological and Legal Licensing of Bias, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 5 (2016).
Id. at 6.
See id. at 15.
Id. at 9.
See, e.g., Payne, supra note 2, at 287–88.
Nathaniel Sobel, What Is Qualified Immunity, and What Does it Have To Do with Police Reform?, LAWFARE
(June 6, 2020, 12:16 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-qualified-immunity-and-what-does-it-have-dopolice-reform.
Hazel Rose Markus & Shinobu Kitayama, Cultures and Selves: A Cycle of Mutual Constitution, 5 PERSPS.
ON PSYCH. SCI. 420, 420 (2010).
Id. at 423.
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culture that surrounds us is more porous than we are often led to believe.38
Although Americans often consider themselves distinctly separate from the culture
in which they inhabit, despite our strident individualism, research has shown that
the line is much blurrier.39 Rather, our conception of our “self” is built by “input
from sociocultural meanings and practices” that are incorporated and reflected by
“sociocultural patterns.”40 Not only does this mean that judges are products of their
environment but also that the parties, attorneys, and witnesses before the courts
are as well.41
Yet the psychological literature and design of many experiments tend to focus
on individuals in highly controlled settings.42 While this is a logical place to start, it
can short-circuit the environmental and cultural effects on individuals. People are
advised to take on the perspectives of the parties and perhaps include examples of
role models from other cultural or ethnic groups to reduce bias.43 These are
important efforts that likely have had some effect on behavior. Yet until the focus is
placed on holistically addressing the judiciary as an environmental context, as well
as reframing System 1 decision making as learned behavior, rather than its current
borderline naturalistic character, it is unrealistic to expect systemic change. At
least one study has shown that presenting the effects of unjust systems, such as the
overincarceration of Black men, can actually result in system justification, even by
those who self-report favoring equality.44 The focus on individual behavior may
have even created some of the issues we now face, such as “aversive” racism that
corresponds to so-called colorblind social norms but nevertheless exhibits biases in
practice.45
II. BEHAVIOR IN CONTEXT: PREJUDICED PLACES AND SOCIAL NORMS
Recently, scholarship has begun to focus more on the systemic rather than
intra-individual factors that shape behavior.46 Pulling bias and prejudices out of the
brain and placing them into the larger world of human action may continue the
progress that implicit bias research started.47
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See id.
See id. at 421, 423, 426.
See id at 423.
See id. at 422–23.
See Mary C. Murphy, Kathryn M. Kroeper & Elise M. Ozier, Prejudiced Places: How Contexts Shape
Inequality and How Policy Can Change Them, 5 POL’Y INSIGHTS FROM BEHAV. BRAIN SCI. 66, 67 (2018).
See Yoona Kang, Jeremy R. Gray & John F. Dovidio, The Nondiscriminating Heart: Lovingkindness
Meditation Training Decreases Implicit Intergroup Bias, 143 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. GEN. 1306, 1314
(2014).
Rebecca C. Hetey & Jennifer L Eberhardt, Racial Disparities in Incarceration Increase Acceptance of
Punitive Policies, 25 PSYCH. SCI. 1949–1954, 1951 (2014).
See John F. Dovidio, On the Nature of Contemporary Prejudice: The Third Wave, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 829, 834–
35 (2001).
See Hetey & Eberhardt, supra note 44; Murphy et al., supra note 42.
See Van Dessel et al., supra note 22, at S223.
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Diversity training, including implicit bias awareness, has become a major
component of organizational training, totaling over $8 billion per year, yet its
effectiveness is by no means certain.48 Many judges are now being trained to
identify, acknowledge, and correct implicit biases.49 Yet it appears that such
training can often meet resistance from subjects who discover a mismatch between
their personal beliefs and an implicit bias test result.50 What is more, those
advocating for change may face the standard intransigence from those who are
happy with the status quo.51
The problems are not limited to System 1 thinking, either: psychological
research has shown System 2 processing to be just as susceptible to deficiencies.52
Even with good intentions, people will respond to the social norms that characterize
the environments in which they behave.53 Awareness of this discrepancy may even
give rise to cognitive dissonance and verbal justification of this apparent
contradiction between personal beliefs and actions.54 The effect of these social
norms can even result in no one taking action despite a room being filled with
smoke, showing that social pressure can outweigh common sense.55 Therefore, even
people with relatively egalitarian views can succumb to this pressure once they
enter hierarchical and traditional institutions like law enforcement, law school, or
the judiciary.56 Individually focused remedies are then less likely to be effective
since the pressure to follow social norms will outmatch most individuals’ own
characteristics.57 The person then offers ostensibly less prejudiced reasons for what
is otherwise biased behavior in an attempt to justify and resolve the tension of their
expressed beliefs and incongruent behavior in practice.58
In the judiciary, external pressures and norms can be especially salient.59
The legitimacy of law as enforced by the courts is “based on the appearance of
stability, continuity, and fidelity to precedent,” meaning tradition and authority are
highly valued.60 The environment and architecture of the courtroom itself, the
language used, even a judge’s robes, all serve to create an aura that may go so far as
48
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60

See Evelyn R. Carter, Ivuoma N. Onyeador & Neil A Lewis, Developing & Delivering Effective Anti-Bias
Training: Challenges & Recommendations, 6 BEHAV. SCI. POL’Y 57, 58 (2020).
Federal and State Court Cooperation: Reducing Bias, FED. JUD. CTR.,
https://www.fjc.gov/content/352779/reducing-bias (last visited Dec. 8, 2020).
Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 9, at 866; see Carter, et al., supra note 48 at 62.
See ELLIOTT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 182 (10th ed. 2008).
See id at 190. (One notorious example is the Heaven’s Gate cult mass suicide, where a few days before their
deaths, members returned a telescope they purchased because it was defective: it didn’t reveal the UFO
they believed trailed the comet.).
Murphy et al., supra note 42, at 69.
See ARONSON, supra note 51, at 194–96.
Bibb Latané & John M. Darley, Bystander “Apathy”, 56 AM. SCIENTIST 244, 250–53 (1969).
See Murphy et al., supra note 42, at 69.
See id.
See Crandall & Eshleman, supra note 4, at 248–49.
See Krieger & Fiske, supra note 24, at 1024.
Id.
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to “instill a great terror” in those who enter it.61 It is likely, then, that being the
center of that environmental experience has a positive feedback effect on judges.62
Judges must be authority figures, after all, since they make rulings on evidence and
judgment as a matter of course63 with only limited means to enforce their decisions,
which overwhelmingly rely on the outward appearance of legitimacy.64
The judiciary is built upon norms of judicial independence, neutrality, and
legal reasoning.65 Since judges gain their status by navigating this system’s
structure, they may then have an incentive to uphold existing legal structures.66
The broader cultural context—as well as certain social groups, such as the small,
elite body of the judiciary—“strongly influence[s] [individual] behavior.”67 Once a
lawyer enters the professional and social class of judicial officeholders, they give up
part of their previous selves to conform to the norms of the group.68 This can be a
positive norm, such as a judge’s oath to apply the law impartially. Conversely, it
may cause the personal beliefs of a new judge to be subsumed by the cultural
pressure.69 For instance, it may be that certain aspects of the criminal justice
system, such as encountering an overrepresentation of minority defendants, may in
turn shape the way a newly appointed, reform-minded judge “process[es] and see[s]
the world.”70
Judges face potentially competing interests in their daily work as well,
whether it is their own policy preferences, long term professional goals, or the
management of their court’s docket.71 All three of these interests may affect decision
making depending on the context of the case.72 Given the particular contingencies of
61
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65

66

67

68

69

70
71

72

Desmond Manderson, Et Lex Perpetua: Dying Declarations & Mozart’s Requiem, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621,
1629 (1999) (discussing the influence of classical theology and music on the structure and ritual of the
courtroom).
This may lead judges to believe themselves to be “above average.” See Guthrie et al., supra note 21, at 811–
14.
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 104(a); FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
See Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCH. 375, 379,
381 (2006).
See Charles Gardner Geyh, Judicial Ethics: A New Paradigm for a New Era, 9 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL
MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 238, 240–41 (2019).
For over a century, legal realism has shown that jurisprudence is often based on a judge’s own preferences
rather than blackletter law. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 45–48 (1987).
See Caroline Schill, John M. Anderies, Therese Lindahl, Carl Folke, Stephen Polasky, Juan Camilo
Cárdenas, Anne-Sophie Crépin, Marco A. Janssen, Jon Norberg & Maja Schlüter, A More Dynamic
Understanding of Human Behaviour for the Anthropocene, 2 NATURE SUSTAINABILITY 1075, 1077 (2019).
Newly appointed or elected judges often attend initial training and then attend judicial conferences, thus
inducting them into a new, elite social group.
See Phia S. Salter, Glenn Adams & Michael J. Perez, Racism in the Structure of Everyday Worlds: A
Cultural-Psychological Perspective, 27 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCH. SCI. 150, 151 (2018); see also
Wendy L. Martinek, Judges as Members of Small Groups in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION
MAKING, 83 (David E. Klein & Gregory Mitchell eds. 2010) (finding judges in appellate courts often face
pressure to conform).
See Salter et al., supra note 69.
Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Robert J. MacCoun & John M. Darley, Multiple Constraint Satisfaction in Judging,
in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 27, 31–32 (David E. Klein & Gregory Mitchell, eds. 2010).
Id. at 28–30.
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the case or proceeding, judges may offer different justifications, ostensibly based in
law, for their decisions.73 Judicial philosophy also plays a part in the justification
role, where an originalist or textualist may proffer an opinion based purely on the
language of the law, or how the law was viewed by its drafters. This, in effect,
shields the judge from accusations of partiality or partisan policy goals by appealing
to a mechanistic or algebraic method of legal reasoning.74
Justification becomes the central issue in evaluating biases and flaws in
judicial decisions. This transforms the automatic System 1 heuristics into reasons
for a particular outcome.75 Just as Americans do not wish to be seen as prejudiced,
judges do not want to be seen as motivated by personally held beliefs or policies.76
Judges, we are told, are just applying the law to facts.77 If the heuristics and biases
of fast thinking therefore trickle up into the deliberative System 2 thinking in the
form of justifications, one has to wonder how valuable interventions based solely on
implicit thinking can be. In fact, researchers have seen strong resistance to implicit
bias training.78 This is especially difficult with judges, given the prevailing judicial
philosophies and norms that mandate impartiality and reasoned decisions based
solely in the law. However, if the scope of judicial reform were to extend beyond
dualistic System 1 processes and focus on a system-wide approach, it would have
two major benefits: First, it would reframe bias as a behavior rather than a
fundamental attribute of the actor. Second, it would require clearer, peer-reviewed
justification of a judge’s reasoning by using argumentative processes.
III. AN IMMOVABLE OBJECT? NAÏVE REALISM IN FOURTH AMENDMENT CONSENT
SEARCH DOCTRINE
This Note focuses on one area of jurisprudence as a case study: Fourth
Amendment consent search doctrine in police investigations. Searches are a major
part of law enforcement activity, which means that any criminal court will likely
hear cases on it, and many appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, will
review those decisions. What’s more, more than ninety percent of warrantless police
searches are executed by consent,79 which means it has critical practical

73
74
75
76
77

78
79

See Crandall & Eshleman., supra note 4, at 248–49; Aronson, supra note 51, at 182.
See John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 21–22 (1924).
See Crandall & Eshleman, supra note 4, at 244–45.
See id. at 237–38.
See Geyh, supra note 65, at 240–41. For an example of potential motivated reasoning in recent cases, see
Ann E. Marimow & Matt Kiefer, Judges Nominated by President Trump Play Key Role in Upholding Voting
Limits Ahead of Election Day, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2020, 8:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/10/31/trump-judges-voting-rights/?arc404=true.
Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 9, at 866.
Ric Simmons, Not Voluntary but Still Reasonable: A New Paradigm for Understanding the Consent
Searches Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773, 773 (2005).
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implications. The extant consent search doctrine has been widely discussed and
criticized in legal scholarship.80
The current doctrine’s consideration of police encounters does not match what
social psychology has been able to show is the case.81 Instead, the courts have relied
mostly on unsubstantiated lay theories rather than a behavioral-realist approach.82
One problem is that the doctrine often treats encounters as an “individualized
process” that does not account for the “social circumstances” surrounding a person’s
decision to consent.83 Decisions have generally relied on whether a person would
have voluntarily consented.84 Expectations of consent behavior, based on lay
theories and syllogistic reasoning, oftentimes do not accurately reflect real-world
situations. In Higgins v. United States, the D.C. Circuit Court stated, “no sane man
who denies his guilt would actually be willing that policemen search his room for
contraband which is certain to be discovered.”85 This certainly appears to make
sense as long as the focus is only on the individual episode; especially if that
individual has the life experience of the average judge and does not account for the
wider circumstances that may affect whether a person feels free to refuse the
search.86
Why is there a breakdown between judicial conceptions of consent and what
actually happens on the streets and in the homes of Americans? A significant factor,
especially in appellate decisions, is the distance between the judge and the person
who consented to the search.87 This is generally known as the actor-observer bias:
judges evaluate the circumstances as a post hoc outsider who may be less likely to
account for situational factors.88 Considering for a moment the day-to-day
experiences of a judicial officer, a position with a high degree of social status, it is
conceivable that saying “no” to a police officer would be much easier for a judicial
officer than for the average person on the street. Every case before a court will take
place after the warrantless search occurs, and such hindsight bias makes
misjudgment more likely.89
80

81
82
83

84
85
86

87
88
89

Just a few examples of the literature include the following scholarly articles: Adrian J. Barrio, Rethinking
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte: Incorporating Obedience Theory into the Supreme Court’s Conception of
Voluntary Consent, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 215 (1997) (detailing how consent doctrine is out of step with
psychological studies on obedience and authority); Simmons, supra note 79; and Russell L. Weaver, The
Myth of “Consent,” 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1195 (2007) (describing the inherent coercive pressure of law
enforcement outside of detention).
See Weaver, supra note 80, at 1199.
See id. at 1198–99.
Orit Gan, Third-Party Consent to Search: Analyzing Triangular Relations, 19 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y
303, 318 (2012).
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248–49 (1973).
Higgins v. United States, 209 F.2d 819, 820 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
See John M. Burkoff, Search Me, 39 TEX. TECH LAW REV. 1109, 1114–15 (2007); Janice Nadler, No Need to
Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, SUP. CT. REV. 153, 167 (2002); see also ROBERT B.
CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION 226 (2007) (recounting a study where subjects were
more likely to be obedient when a confederate was dressed like a security guard instead of plain clothes).
See Burkoff, supra note 86, at 1129.
Id.
See Dorothy K. Kagehiro, Psycholegal Research on the Fourth Amendment, 1 PSYCH. SCI. 187, 188 (1990).
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The fact that a judge does not review a warrantless search until after it has
already occurred further compounds the problem.90 Cases that reach the courtroom
are only those where the prosecutor or grand jury has made the decision to charge
and the defendant has not (yet) agreed to a plea bargain, which generally means
police searches that fail to turn up contraband or incriminating evidence are rarely
given judicial review. This filtering effect may impact a judge’s perspective on the
effectiveness of searches as well as the circumstances where consent is given. For
example, the New Jersey Supreme Court has stated, “It is consonant with good
morals, and the Constitution, to exploit a criminal’s ignorance or stupidity in the
detectional [sic] process.”91 This statement begs the question of who is or is not a
criminal. In a system based on the presumption of innocence, a parade of
convictions will begin to shift the perspective of those who work in this environment
on a daily basis.92 By the very nature of their work environment, judges may
develop hunches or intuitions of who is part of the supposed criminal element and
who is not, but they may not be cognizant of the underlying processes leading to
that conclusion.
Further compounding the actor-observer bias is a hypothesis known as
speech-act theory.93 Depending on the situation and the speaker, questions like
“[Y]ou wouldn’t mind . . . if I take a look in the bag?” may not be innocuous
questions, but rather “imply[] forcefulness.”94 In a study, participants were more
likely to view the receiver to have more choice to consent when the request was
phrased as a question rather than a statement.95 However, in actual interactions
between individuals, and especially those involving police, the specific words used
may belie the speaker’s intent or the listener’s perception.96 Police do not have to
rely on coercive language because of their role as an authority figure, backed up
with the implicit threat of violence and detention.97 In a linguistic analysis of body
camera footage, researchers found significant racial differences in the level of
formality and respect in an officer’s language, even when controlling for the race of
the police officer.98
Despite the courts’ reluctance to account for the coercive pressure of
authority figures, nearly all introductory psychology courses will include a section
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on authority featuring Stanley Milgram’s experiments, among the most famous, (or
infamous) in popular culture.99 Subjects were brought in for a supposed study on
the effect of punishment on learning and were instructed to deliver an everincreasing electric shock to the learner.100 This learner was in fact a confederate of
the experimenter who was only acting out a response.101 Near the end of the scale of
shocks were settings labeled “danger: severe shock” and “XXX.”102 Whenever the
subject wanted to stop delivering the shock, an experimenter, often clad in a white
lab coat, would tell them that they could and should proceed.103 Importantly, no one
was threatened or forced to proceed.104
Rather than a scientist in a lab coat, targets of searches face a police officer
with a badge and gun asking for cooperation.105 Yet, according to the Supreme
Court, the targets do not even need to be made aware that refusing the search is an
option.106 The Supreme Court, contrary to these empirical data, held that these
signs of authority, aside from an outright claim of lawful authority to search, should
be given “little weight.”107
What is to account for this “ever-widening gap” between courts and social
psychology?108 The Supreme Court has upheld its view of consent as recently as
2002,109 maintaining the basic “‘free to refuse/terminate’ test” from prior seizure
cases.110 Despite an avowed “totality of the circumstances” test,111 which the
scientific literature shows ought to include individual and community experiences,
the Court’s decisions more often fail to account for all but a limited set of
circumstances.112 Yet psychology makes it clear that people do not make decisions
in a vacuum; there is a variety of contingencies that affect even our most mundane
decisions.113
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Despite the subjective and objective test developed in Schneckloth, courts
have all but abandoned the subjective component, instead focusing on objective
factors.114 More often, courts will find a consent to search voluntary so long as the
record does not show any misconduct by the police, such as an improper claim of
authority or an overt threat of physical violence.115 An overreliance on objective
tests permits judges to exclude personal factors like histories of negative encounters
with police, whether individually or within a community, or even the apprehension
that failing to comply may lead to further harassment or harm, including arrest or
violence.116
Even coercive environments, which were the paramount concern in Miranda
v. Arizona’s Fifth Amendment analysis, are often given a free pass in this Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.117 In two cases, United States v. Drayton and INS v.
Delgado, the Supreme Court considered two environments: an interstate bus where
a police officer stands in the aisle to ask questions of passengers and workplaces
where workers are not free to leave their workspace due to employer policy,
respectively.118 Neither case found the police activity to be so coercive as to violate
the Fourth Amendment.119 Police are more or less able to take advantage of
environments where people feel less free to leave independently of police activity in
order to question individuals,120 as if a person considers the source of their
constraint to be relevant rather than the police officer’s presence in front of them. If
these cases are any indication of the Court’s ongoing views of the effect of the
environment on a person’s ability to consent, there is still a long way to go before
the law catches up with actual human behavior.
Yet there may be some hope for future changes to the doctrine. In Bovat v.
Vermont, a recent consent search case where the Supreme Court ultimately denied
certiorari, Justice Gorsuch, in a statement joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan,
noted that with “the rise of the knock and talk have come more and more cases
testing the boundaries of the consent on which they depend.”121 Unfortunately, it is
probably not a clarion call for major reform, since the statement mainly relies on
property-based theories and concern for the “sanctity of the home” and the curtilage
of the property, rather than the authority-based concerns of social psychology.122
But a recognition that even ostensibly consensual police encounters may be
problematic is an important step in the right direction.
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A. Colorblindness in Evaluating Legal Claims and the Effect of Justification
Race is an important aspect of consent search criticism and in American
criminal justice generally.123 A study of consent searches conducted during traffic
stops in New Jersey revealed that seventy-seven percent of consent searches were of
minorities, despite comprising only fifteen percent of the drivers on the road.124 A
host of biases, heuristics, and structural social behaviors are at play here, especially
as invidious and overt discrimination has declined.125
Yet this colorblind approach, where only open racial hostility is accounted for,
can end up having detrimental effects that directly counter its stated purpose of
equal treatment.126 This becomes even more evident in cases dealing directly with
race. The law, along with many social groups and institutions, has adopted
colorblind mentalities and policies that aim to set aside traditional racial
stereotypes and purportedly treat everyone the same.127 In a study of a workplace
setting, white participants were less likely to provide constructive feedback to
people of color for fear that it may be perceived as biased.128 This means people of
color miss out on a key part of the work environment,129 which is also in part
explained by white people’s aversiveness to racial issues and discussions.130 Such
aversiveness may also be reflected in antidiscrimination doctrine.
As Krieger and Fiske have detailed, judges will often supplement their own
common sense impressions rather than evidence-based theories of human
behavior.131 A trial court judge in chambers is certainly not always prepared to take
judicial notice of psychological research given the pressure of the court’s docket, and
appellate courts face similar pressure.132 In light of these pressures and the
imperative of appearing impartial, judges must make a slew of legal decisions in a
limited amount of time.
Legal doctrine still nevertheless requires a degree of intentionality to
discriminatory behavior.133 This is despite overwhelming evidence that such
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behavior can occur without the actor’s conscious decision134 or can be explained by
another superficial reason.135 Disparate impact tests, which can detect differences
between similarly situated groups, have largely been rejected because they lack the
required intentionality.136 Colorblindness can provide an avenue for rationalization
and justification of potentially racially motivated behavior.137 In the same sense,
consent searches are evaluated in an objective manner that ignores the subjective
intent of individual officers.138
Once the discussion turns to rationalizing and justification, we are now out
of System 1 flaws and into System 2’s own issues.139 In effect, the bad fast thinking
trickles into the slow thinking that is expressed verbally as reasons for our
behavior. It therefore appears that no matter how much education and training in
the judiciary is aimed at reducing System 1 biases and heuristics, it may not be
enough. Justification can paper over many of the biases that are developed early on
in life.140 Legal realists in the early twentieth century understood that judges do not
deliberate and create law in a vacuum; rather, their policy preferences and
ideologies have an effect.141 Yet the edifice of legal doctrine, both substantively and
in norms such as stare decisis, provides a framework for justification.
As discussed above, a new judge entering the judiciary is inducted into a new
social group with its own set of norms and expectations.142 The “explanatory” nature
of justification provides a veneer of reason that packages implicit biases and lay
theories of human behavior into legalistic explanations.143 System justification is a
powerful force that helps maintain the status quo for those who benefit from or
depend on it.144 The judiciary’s institutional integrity is one of its critical
components, which means judges may be more likely to make decisions that do not
call the system into question.145 Nowhere is this more evident than in McClesky v.
Kemp, in which the Court rejected a challenge to a capital sentencing because if
“[t]aken to its logical conclusion, [it would] throw[] into serious question the
principles that underlie our . . . criminal justice system.”146
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Since the implicit thinking invariably bubbles up into a judge’s conscious
thoughts and expressed language,147 it seems unlikely that only remedying the
implicit aspects will yield significant results. Instead, we have seen how implicit
biases can become codified into explanatory justifications148 that produced the same
outcome and are often insulated from judicial review because these justifications
provide legal rationales to shield biased decisions from scrutiny.149
IV. REFORMING DECISION MAKING TO COMBAT NAÏVE REALISM AND BIASES AT
THE SYSTEM LEVEL
There are two system-level approaches that can provide substantial positive
change to the judiciary. The first, argumentative theory, puts the focus on the
relative isolation of individuals, in this case judges, in their decision making.150
Expanding the role of panels or at least requiring more explicit reasoning for
decisions can make the judiciary fairer and more transparent. Second, complex
adaptive systems is an approach that shifts perspectives towards seeing how
policies create context and influence their change over time.151 Supplementing
individual-based approaches like diversity and implicit bias training with these two
approaches would provide additional ammunition for reformers seeking to address
inequities in judicial decision making at both levels and potentially bring about
meaningful change.
A. Argumentative Theory
Krieger and Fiske have themselves suggested expanding, at the very least,
the sources that judges use in their decision making to include taking “reasonable
steps, whether through the solicitation of expert testimony, amicus participation, or
otherwise, to make sure they have the science right.”152 However, because the need
to follow precedent since Schneckloth means that only cursory examinations are
really necessary, and less immediate or less obvious circumstances surrounding a
discrimination claim are not necessarily included in the “totality.”153 Beyond
expanding the scope of review, restructuring the manner in which judicial decisions
are made can also help bring out more just outcomes.
Argumentative theory seeks to do two things: recognize that many of the
perceived flaws of reasoning—that is, a great deal of System 2 cognition—are a
result of isolation and lack of introspection; and reconceptualize reasoning as a
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dialogue or argument.154 The first step is recognizing the differences between
inferences and reasons. An inference is the “extraction of new information from
information already available.”155 On the other hand, reasoning is the “process of
pursuing . . . goal[s] by attending to reasons.”156 That is to say, reasoning should not
be the introspection and a priori syllogisms of a single individual, but a process that
humans use to persuade others of a position.157 Fundamentally, reasoning requires
one to have a partner in dialogue for reasoning to properly function. One generally
cannot go throughout the day without making inferences, but it is possible to go
long stretches of time without having to reason.158 When we are left alone to reason,
we tend to fall victim to heuristics like confirmation bias, either because our ideas
are not challenged or because we only consider reasons easily available to us that
would not pass muster with an unconvinced party.159
In applying this principle to courts and judges, there is a parallel. Trial
courts generally consist of a single judge, while appellate courts rely on panels of
judges. However, panels themselves are not a panacea.160 For example, conferences
among the justices in the Rehnquist Court were terse and limited to each justice
making their point and moving on without debate.161 Additionally, a single judge
sitting on a trial court case is often necessary due to the need for quick decisions
during trials and limited government resources. However, the problems associated
with single-judge courts have been acknowledged as far back as 1766 by
Blackstone.162
Using argumentative theory as a guiding framework, the judiciary could be
reformed to better complement this type of reasoning. In effect, it would extend the
implicit dialogue that happens when judges offer concurring or dissenting opinions
or when courts develop concurrent doctrines in different jurisdictions. Bringing
judicial decision making out of isolation and into argumentative settings is the
primary goal. For dispositive rulings, such as summary judgment, panels of judges
could be formed from various state courts within a determined judicial district. The
panel would conference and discuss the issue before the court issues a written
opinion by a majority of the judges. Federal district courts already do this in cases
required by Congress or in constitutional challenges to apportionment of legislative
districts.163
Admittedly, a structural change of this magnitude would incur significant
costs, both in the courts’ physical infrastructure and in the salaries of judges, clerks,
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163

See MERCIER & SPERBER, supra note 7 at 44–46.
Id. at 53.
Id.
See id. at 52–53.
Id.
See id. at 212–216; O’Neill, supra note 139, at 849–50.
See O’Neill, supra note 139, at 850.
Id. at 850–51.
MERCIER & SPERBER, supra note 7, at 271.
28 U.S.C. § 2284(a).

2022]

Implicating Implicit Bias in the Judiciary

491

and administrative staff. Yet there is already a movement to expand the federal
judiciary to meet increased caseloads.164 This plan would ultimately provide
dividends for every participant and community impacted by the judiciary and could
improve perceptions of the criminal justice system’s legitimacy. Expanding the
judiciary to permit review by multiple judges is the most powerful way to reduce
biases and lay theories of human behavior. Even if a wholesale expansion could not
happen, state legislatures could take a more modest reform by increasing the
number of paid professional law clerks in state courts. This would give every
chambers an additional ear for a judge and allow for a conference of sorts between
the judge and two or more clerks, with a designated “devil’s advocate” role to ensure
the discussions do not fall into groupthink.165
One might rightly ask what hope junior judges and law clerks might have
given the authority of a senior judge. One such example is the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Scott v. Harris, authored by Justice Scalia, which found that “no
reasonable person” could disagree with its finding that the suspect who was fleeing
police in his car was a substantial danger to all those around him.166 This firm
conclusion was reached despite a lengthy and reasoned dissent by Justice Stevens
(ironically Scalia’s senior), essentially showing that reasonable minds do in fact
differ in this perception despite Scalia’s stern words to the contrary.167 A
subsequent study also found that a significant minority of lay subjects disagreed
with the Court’s majority.168 So, if Justice Stevens was left out in the cold by the
majority justices, it may be difficult to ask a young lawyer or judge to engage in
argument with a more senior judge. Yet coupling this reform among others,
including traditional methods of raising awareness of biases, could begin to shift the
judicial culture and practice.
Alternatively, or in addition to the changes above, the role of juries could also
be expanded. Although subject to many of the same biases and social norms as
judges,169 juries can come to just outcomes with proper guidance and implicit bias
training.170 Grand juries are a constitutional requirement at the federal level171 and
are often used at the state level either by law or by discretion in difficult or
prominent cases.172 Similarly, legal expert review boards could be implemented in
164
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specialized areas to provide nonbinding opinions to judges, especially in budgetconscious state courts.
The role of precedent is also key here. Because of increased caseloads, there
has been a growing practice in the courts to issue memorandum opinions that limit
precedential value.173 Motivated by concerns about judicial economy, these opinions
cut off the conversation between judges, advocates, and scholars.174 While routine
cases may not require the same in-depth explanation as a case of first impression,
sealing off decisions from the rest of the common law is antithetical to
argumentative theory.
Oftentimes, judicial opinions are crafted in a way that asserts the certainty of
the majority’s position.175 The reason for this is to demonstrate impartiality and
assure the parties and the public that the courts are applying the law to facts rather
than using personal preferences or prejudices.176 Yet such certitude in the opinion
handed down may increase conflict and negative views of the decision.177 Beginning
in law school, educators could explicitly emphasize reckoning with
counterarguments and the strengths of the opposing sides in objective legal writing
and argument not so much to dispel them, but to recognize them as separate
grounds for an alternative conclusion. The goal is not finding some metaphysical
truth but rather recognizing that many legal decisions are not easy calls, and the
decision maker should arrive at a conclusion that can garner support and,
ultimately, respect and legitimacy.178 It is a little ironic that opinions written with
such certainty are often at the end of a long process of litigation and contradictory
decisions by several courts before reaching institutions like the Supreme Court,
which gets swept under the rug of supposed assuredness in the law.179 Given this
interest in the legitimacy of its decisions, when a court frames a divisive issue as
relatively straightforward, or worse, indisputably in favor of one side, it may have a
backfiring effect.180
The problems reformers face can often seem insurmountable and the
remedies impracticable. There is little doubt that the judiciary is a particularly
slow-moving institution in American society, often by design. Yet law schools and
legislatures do have tools at their disposal. Changing the system can begin by
reimagining the system. Complex adaptive systems (CAS) is a developing theory
that can be used to analyze systems with a myriad of moving parts and the
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involvement of many actors.181

B. Complex Adaptive Systems
Adopting pro-social behaviors into the system that tap into empathy and a
sense of belonging is integral to CAS.182 The work of Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom,
has highlighted that a commons-based approach can increase positive collective
action in systems where individualism can have detrimental effects.183 The judiciary
is a critical institution in American society that depends on outward legitimacy to
enforce its decisions. Making the courts more representative—both literally in its
personnel and in its doctrine—could increase buy-in from traditionally marginalized
groups. Using argumentative theory could help bring in otherwise marginal ideas
and points of view, especially when coupled with implicit bias awareness and
inclusivity in its structure.
Paying attention to local norms and ensuring that courts and judicial
administration positively reflect multiculturalism and inclusiveness can help
broaden the sense of community and remove the environmental factors that can
increase biased behaviors.184 Starting with law school and throughout continuing
legal education, judicial conferences, and other bar organizations, leaders can
emphasize the connectedness of the judiciary to the communities they serve and the
role judges play within society at large.185 Since individuals create culture, and
culture feeds back to the individual, setting these norms in a pro-social context is
critical.186 Recognizing the role that communities play in fostering the legitimacy of
the judiciary may help rebuild trust for those whom it has harmed.187
Additionally, removing the artifacts and signals of illiberal times is
important.188 Courthouses can be renamed; statutes and portraits can be replaced to
ensure that the symbols surrounding the judiciary are not dominated by one group.
Along with that, the expansion of judicial panels and clerkships should emphasize
hiring lawyers who are still underrepresented in the profession to bring both racial
as well as cultural and intellectual diversity to the fore. As a new, broader
community is developed, buy-in should increase and decisions may be viewed as
more just. These system-level changes will begin to replace the environment and
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culture that still harbor biased behavior that infects both System 1 and System 2
thinking by focusing on the entire contingency of actor and environment.

CONCLUSION
While remedial efforts to reduce implicit biases and “fast” System 1 thinking
have at least caused judges to perhaps think twice, they are still going to be
constrained by the environment they inhabit. Despite more than two decades of
piecemeal reforms, many of the problems in the judiciary—whether it is racial or
cultural biases or enormous caseloads that prevent a truly holistic appraisal of a
party—remain pressing, if not intractable, issues.
Therefore, in addition to these measures, the judiciary and the legislatures
that oversee them should look to address the systemic issues within institutions.
Reformers to the system should avoid a strictly individual approach to implicit bias
training by supplementing it with structural changes that will further reduce the
prejudice within the judiciary itself. Viewing system-wide issues— such as who is
nominated for judicial office, the system for selecting law clerks, admissions policies
at law schools; or legislative issues like increasingly criminalized behavior—as an
interconnected network can yield necessary progress. No doubt it will take time and
building consensus across multiple groups and interests, but a comprehensive
approach that utilizes argumentative theory and complex adaptive systems may be
the only way to effectively bring about such reforms.

